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  1731 
“MAYBE SOMEONE DIES”: THE DILEMMA 
OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM AND INTERNET 
EDGE PROVIDER LIABILITY 
Abstract: In the aftermath of a string of highly publicized violent attacks moti-
vated by far-right extremism, the public spotlight has swung its harsh light over 
tech companies—particularly social media platforms—for hosting extremism 
and allegedly facilitating radicalization online. With commentators across the 
political spectrum searching for solutions to a growing problem, the rumbling 
discourse has inevitably pivoted toward those platforms, with some suggesting 
that they should be liable for the content they host. Federal terrorism law and 
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act pose seemingly insurmountable 
hurdles to this end, but both recent congressional challenges to the CDA and in-
creasingly creative legal arguments against it may eliminate it as a barrier. This 
Note argues that although radicalization on the Internet poses grave safety con-
cerns, the law may find compromise without eroding the CDA. This Note first 
analyzes the massive ramifications of imposing liability on the Internet writ 
large, then proposes intermediate solutions via amending federal terrorism law 
that will do the least harm to the Internet ecosystem while attempting to solve a 
growing problem of violence. 
INTRODUCTION 
On a warm afternoon in August of 2017, James Fields rammed his car 
through a crowd of people.1 The crowd had just finished protesting against 
the white supremacist “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
but as they marched peacefully away on the street, Fields turned onto the 
block, reversed, then plowed his Dodge Challenger through the crowd.2 The 
attack was brutal, hurtling people over the car, leaving thirty-five injured on 
the pavement, and killing a young woman named Heather Heyer.3 Fields 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Paul Duggan, Charge Upgraded to First-Degree Murder for Driver Accused of Ramming 
Charlottesville Crowd, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/
driver-accused-of-plowing-into-charlottesville-crowd-killing-heather-heyer-due-in-court/2017/12/
13/6cbb4ce8-e029-11e7-89e8-edec16379010_story.html [https://perma.cc/8HUV-YTMF] [here-
inafter Duggan, Charge Upgraded]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Paul Duggan, Neo-Nazi Sympathizer Pleads Guilty to Federal Hate Crimes for Plowing Car 
into Protesters at Charlottesville Rally, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/public-safety/neo-nazi-sympathizer-pleads-guilty-to-federal-hate-crimes-for-plowing-
car-into-crowd-of-protesters-at-unite-the-right-rally-in-charlottesville/2019/03/27/2b947c32-50ab-
11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story.html [https://perma.cc/BVH9-W2EK]. 
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was only twenty years old when he attacked the crowd, and he is now a 
convicted murderer.4 He is also a neo-Nazi.5 
Organizers of “Unite the Right” advertised the rally as both a protest 
against the removal of a Robert E. Lee memorial and, more importantly, as 
an opportunity to unify splintered far-right and alt-right groups under a 
banner of white nationalism.6 During the rally and demonstrations that fol-
lowed, marchers carried paraphernalia adorned with extremist right-wing 
logos and repeatedly shouted slogans associated with Nazism and white 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. Fields was initially charged with second-degree murder, but prosecutor Joe Platania an-
nounced the upgraded charge after reviewing video evidence from both a nearby restaurant’s and the 
surveillance cameras of a Virginia State Police helicopter. Duggan, Charge Upgraded, supra note 1; 
Kaylee Hartung & Darran Simon, Charge Upgraded Against Suspect in Charlottesville Rally Killing, 
CNN (Dec. 15, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/14/us/charlottesville-james-alex-
fields-court-appearance/index.html [https://perma.cc/G78E-3BRP]. Whether the crash was pre-
meditated and intentional was initially disputed, with many claiming Fields acted in a state of 
panic, but prosecutors claimed the footage shows Fields’ car stopping a block away from the pro-
testers, reversing, then driving directly into the crowd before reversing and speeding away. Dug-
gan, Charge Upgraded, supra note 1. Fields was ultimately convicted in state court of one count 
of first-degree murder, five counts of “aggravated malicious wounding,” and three counts of “ma-
licious wounding,” and he faces additional counts in federal court. Paul Duggan, James A. Fields 
Jr. Sentenced to Life in Prison in Charlottesville Car Attack, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/james-a-fields-jr-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-in-
charlottesville-car-attack/2018/12/11/8b205a90-fcc8-11e8-ad40-cdfd0e0dd65a_story.html [https://
perma.cc/5XKZ-3KUB]. Of the thirty-five people injured, eight were critically injured and suf-
fered “permanent and significant physical impairment.” Duggan, Charge Upgraded, supra note 1. 
 5 Abigail Hauslohner, Paul Duggan, Jack Gillum & Aaron C. Davis, James Fields Jr.: A Neo-
Nazi’s Violent, Rage-Fueled Journey to Charlottesville, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-james-fields-jr-charlottesville-20170818-story.html [https://
perma.cc/HF4U-Z2P9?type=image]. 
 6 Ryan M. Kelly, Kessler Discusses KKK, Unite the Right Rallies and His Political Beliefs, 
DAILY PROGRESS (Jul 11, 2017), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/kessler-discusses-kkk-
unite-the-right-rallies-and-his-political/article_610ca84a-66a0-11e7-af48-1389a3205b81.html 
[https://perma.cc/HB66-KTY7]. The rally’s organizer, Jason Kessler, is an extremist right-wing 
blogger from Charlottesville and founder of white nationalist groups Unity and Security for America 
(also called “UniSecAmerica”), and The New Byzantium Project. Id.; Jason Kessler, S. POVERTY L. 
CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/jason-kessler [https://perma.
cc/MSL5-A4CY]; Jason Kessler, Announcing the New Byzantium Project, PROTECT THE WEST 
(Sept. 24, 2017), https://jasonkessler.us/2017/09/24/announcing-the-formation-new-byzantium [https://
perma.cc/SM83-U55S]. Like many far-right groups, UniSecAmerica describes its mission as “de-
fending Western Civilization, including its history, culture, and peoples.” See UniSecAmerica, FA-
CEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/UniSecAmerica [https://perma.cc/BTF5-GKCE]. Despite 
Kessler’s denial that he is a white supremacist, he is an avowed pro-white advocate and member of 
the white nationalist movement. See Kelly, supra note 6; Kessler supra. White nationalism is gener-
ally understood to be an umbrella term for white supremacist and white separatist ideology, and the 
Southern Poverty Law Center has classified Kessler as a white nationalist. See White Nationalist, S. 
POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/white-nationalist 
[https://perma.cc/EA4Y-VEJC]; Jason Kessler, supra. 
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nationalism.7 Fields had traveled from his home in Ohio to attend the rally, 
participating in the protests and marching with the neo-Nazi group Van-
guard America.8 Though he made the journey by himself, as evidenced by 
the rapidly-growing white nationalist movement, he is not alone in his be-
liefs.9 
The Charlottesville attack, motivated by extremism and formally de-
scribed as domestic terrorism by the Department of Justice, may be a prod-
uct of modern social unrest, but domestic terrorism itself is not a new phe-
nomenon.10 From the Ku Klux Klan to the Black Liberation Army to the 
Earth Liberation Front, extremist organizations that breed domestic terror-
ism have existed in the United States for decades.11 Recently, however, 
these groups have seen a sharp uptick in activity.12 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Deconstructing the Symbols and Slogans Spotted in Charlottesville, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-videos [https://perma.
cc/HAC5-34WQ]. 
 8 Hauslohner et al., supra note 5; see Vanguard America, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://
www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/vanguard-america [https://perma.cc/785K-R74K] 
(discussing Vanguard America’s increasing presence as a neo-Nazi extremist group). Although Van-
guard America officially denies any affiliation with Fields, Fields was well-known in high school for 
espousing neo-Nazi views consistent with the group’s mission. See Hauslohner et al., supra note 5 
(interviewing Fields’s former teacher about Fields’s infatuation with Adolf Hitler and the Third 
Reich); Justin Moyer & Lindsey Bever, Vanguard America, a White Supremacist Group, Denies 
Charlottesville Ramming Suspect Was a Member, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/vanguard-america-a-white-supremacist-group-denies-charlottesville-
attacker-was-a-member/2017/08/15/2ec897c6-810e-11e7-8072-73e1718c524d_story.html [https://
perma.cc/W9Q2-CYHD]. Vanguard America has denounced the attack, though Unite the Right rally 
organizer Jason Kessler maintains Fields’ innocence. See Moyer & Bever, supra; Jason Kessler 
(@TheMadDimension), TWITTER, https://web.archive.org/web/20180810224118/https:/twitter.com/
TheMadDimension/status/941453577981218816 [https://perma.cc/J6DM-JNZP]. 
 9 Duggan, Charge Upgraded, supra note 1; see Lauren Meltzer & Tony Dokoupil, Hate Ris-
ing: White Supremacy’s Rise in the U.S., CBS NEWS (Aug. 21, 2017, 5:57 PM), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/hate-rising-cbsn-on-assignment [https://perma.cc/3SYG-2MK9] (documenting 
the recent rise of white supremacy in the United States). 
10 Duggan, Charge Upgraded, supra note 1; Michael Edison Hayden, Sessions Defends Trump’s 
Comments on Charlottesville, Says Car Ramming Fits Definition of Domestic Terror, ABC News, 
(Aug. 14, 2017, 8:07 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20170829184136/http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/trumps-attorney-general-evil-charlottesville-car-ramming-fits/story?id=49202191 [https://
perma.cc/HN65-V8ZC]; Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-time
line/?utm_term=.1420105843ac. [https://perma.cc/G7D5-J3UK]; see infra notes 11–12 and ac-
companying text (describing the origins of domestic terrorism). 
 11James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, Address Before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and 
Forest Health (Feb. 12, 2002), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-
terrorism [https://perma.cc/U73T-ZR5U]; John W. Harris, Jr., Domestic Terrorism in the 1980’s, 
56 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 5, 7 (1987); Ku Klux Klan, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.
splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan [https://perma.cc/REQ6-ABMC]. 
 12 Hate Map, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map [https://perma.cc/
9F62-6DJW]. 
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In the last ten years, far-right violent attacks have skyrocketed, and be-
tween 1999 and 2017, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported an in-
crease in the number of active hate groups from 457 to 954.13 This outbreak 
is not restricted to the United States; the growing prominence of far-right 
political parties in Europe is well-documented, and in Britain, the number 
of suspected far-right extremists flagged for terror observation jumped thir-
ty percent within the past year.14 
While quantifying hate is not an easy task, numerous studies attribute 
this dramatic swell to the advent of the Internet and particularly to social 
media platforms.15 The Internet is ubiquitous: in 2018, eighty-nine percent 
of Americans used the Internet, and approximately seven in ten had a social 
media profile or presence.16 Part and parcel of that ubiquity, however, are 
tools that both facilitate easy communication for existing extremist opera-
tives and accelerate self-radicalization among non-extremists.17 In addition 
to the jihadi militant group ISIS’s widely-publicized use of Twitter and 
YouTube as recruiting platforms, far-right- and far-left-wing extremist 
groups marinate in radicalizing echo chambers on Facebook, Twitter, Red-
dit, and similar websites, where they coordinate tactics and events.18 The 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id.; see Peter Bergen et al., Part IV. What Is the Threat to the United States Today?, NEW 
AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-
today [https://perma.cc/LAY6-WGH9]. Black separatist and far-left extremist groups have also 
seen increased activity, but violent acts are comparatively rare. Bergen et al., supra. 
 14 See Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Number of Far-Right Extremists Flagged to Government Terror 
Unit Soars 30% in a Year, INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
home-news/finsbury-park-attack-far-right-extremist-rise-year-statistics-prevent-terrorism-scheme-
referrals-a7798231.html [https://perma.cc/5HA3-FQF3]; Amanda Taub, What the Far Right’s 
Rise May Mean for Germany’s Future, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/26/world/europe/germany-far-right-election.html [https://perma.cc/PT2G-QCPR]. 
 15 See, e.g., Robin Thompson, Radicalization and the Use of Social Media, 4 J. STRATEGIC 
SECURITY 167, 168 (2012). 
 16 Monica Anderson et al., 11% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are They? (Mar. 5, 
2018), PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-
dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they [https://perma.cc/8FVS-TQHH] (noting further that of the 
11% of Americans who do not use the Internet at all, most are seniors; only 2% of all Americans 
aged 18–29 do not use the Internet); Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 
2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media [https://perma.cc/694U-R7WB]. 
 17 See Thompson, supra note 15, at 171–72. 
 18 See, e.g., J.M. BERGER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, NAZIS 
VS. ISIS ON TWITTER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WHITE NATIONALIST AND ISIS ONLINE SO-
CIAL MEDIA NETWORKS 3–4, 21 (2016) (documenting a 600% increase in followers for right-wing 
extremists on Twitter between 2012 and 2016); Hate on Social Media: A Look at Hate Groups 
and Their Twitter Presence, SAFE HOME, https://www.safehome.org/resources/hate-on-social-
media [https://perma.cc/S57L-MRGB] [hereinafter Hate on Social Media] (documenting the broad 
and growing presence of hate groups on Twitter since 2009, including the increase of average 
“likes” per post from 0.21 “likes” in 2012 to 7.68 “likes” in 2016); Christina Peneda, What Does 
ISIS Post on YouTube?, HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL LIBRARY (July 27, 2018) [https://perma.
cc/QSK3-4NXW] (documenting ISIS’s use of YouTube). 
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Charlottesville rally that James Fields attended was itself organized through 
both Facebook and privately hosted message boards.19 
The Internet zeroes out information costs, allowing mass dissemination 
of what were once fringe ideologies by way of informational websites, dis-
cussion forums, and social media.20 This cheap, easy, and often anonymous 
communication is the common denominator in extremist groups’ abilities to 
organize and shepherd new members.21 The facilitators of this easy com-
munication are so-called “edge providers,” meaning any entity on the Inter-
net that provides content or services, such as social media and Internet mes-
sage boards.22 While far-right extremist content created by and for extrem-
ists can be found on their own niche websites like IronMarch.org or Storm-
front.org, extremists also have significant (and rising) presence on social 
media.23 Common social media platforms include well-known edge provid-
ers like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, but social media also encompasses 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Alex Heath, Facebook Removed the Event Page for White Nationalist ‘Unite the Right’ 
Rally in Charlottesville One Day Before It Took Place, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2017, 5:36 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-removed-unite-the-right-charlottesville-rally-event-
page-one-day-before-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/FFE3-ZHVT] (discussing Facebook’s removal of 
the rally event page one day before the event itself); see Dara Kerr, White Supremacist Parties? 
Airbnb Says Not in My House, CNET (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:27 PM), https://www.cnet.com/uk/news/
airbnb-says-no-white-supremacist-parties-in-my-house [https://perma.cc/9LFN-TDDU?type=image] 
(citing the forum of the now-defunct far-right website The Daily Stormer, which Unite the Right 
rally attendees used to organize transportation and lodging via Airbnb (https://bbs.dailystormer.
com/t/join-daily-stormer-staff-at-the-unite-the-right-rally-in-charlottesville-virginia/124489/68)). 
 20 Anne Stenersen, The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp? 20 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 
215, 215–33 (2008); Thompson, supra note 15, at 168. 
 21 Stenersen, supra note 20, at 215–33; Thompson, supra note 15, at 168. 
 22 FCC Open Internet Order, 47 C.F.R. § 8.2(a) (2015) (defining edge provider as “[a]ny 
individual or entity that provides any content, application, or service over the Internet, and any 
individual or entity that provides a device used for accessing any content, application, or service 
over the Internet”); Thompson, supra note 15, at 171–72. “Edge providers” take their name from 
the layered architecture of the Internet. Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-
Conscious Approach, 24. B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 199 (2018). For regulation purposes, the 
Internet is comprised of two layers: physical infrastructure (such as broadband cable), and applica-
tions that run on the physical infrastructure (such as social media websites). Id. The physical infra-
structure comprises the “core” of the network, carrying data between the applications and individ-
uals at the “edges” of the network. Id. 
 23 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 18; Hate on Social Media, supra note 18; Welcome to Hate Plan-
et, IRON MARCH, https://web.archive.org/web/20171106202658/http://ironmarch.org [https://perma.
cc/EK29-EMT7]; Welcome to Stormfront, STORMFRONT, http://www.stormfront.org [https://
perma.cc/QW48-6YLL] (framing their mission as equivalent to other celebrations of minority 
culture). Stormfront, founded in 1995, is one of the oldest white supremacist websites and is today 
predominantly focused on recontextualizing white nationalism to seem more reasonable and thus 
more easily digestible to conservatives in mainstream politics. Priscilla Marie Meddaugh & Jack 
Kay, Hate Speech or “Reasonable Racism?” The Other in Stormfront, 24 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS, 
251, 251 (2009). 
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any application that enables users to network with one another.24 Like any 
other Internet users, white supremacist groups use all forms of Internet 
communications.25 White supremacists are certainly not the only extremists 
who use the Internet, but because the majority of domestic terror attacks 
within the past ten years have been committed by far-right extremists, this 
Note focuses on far-right ideology.26 
Fields’s attack amplified public consciousness of far right extremism 
and contributed to discourse about the interplay between the Internet and 
rapid radicalization, and what, if anything, the law should do about it.27 In 
search of a cause for increasingly violent domestic terror attacks, critics of 
edge providers cite providers’ perceived inability (or unwillingness) to cur-
tail extremist and terrorist use of their platforms.28 While some commenta-
tors advise that edge providers take internal action, like suspending and de-
monetizing extremist users’ accounts, recent lawsuits, articles, and opinion 
pieces suggest another solution: hold the edge providers liable for providing 
support to domestic terrorists.29 This advocacy follows current litigation 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
social%20media [https://perma.cc/SH77-UQHX]; Margaret Rouse, Edge Provider, WHATIS (Apr. 
2017) https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/edge-provider [https://perma.cc/8N2R-G5S9]; su-
pra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Berger, supra note 18 (documenting broad use of various Internet platforms by white 
supremacists). 
 26 See SÉRAPHIN ALAVA ET AL., UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI., & CULTURAL ORG, YOUTH 
AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON SOCIAL MEDIA: MAPPING THE RESEARCH 23 (2017) http://unes
doc.unesco.org/images/0026/002603/260382e.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN9T-VXUU] (finding that 
Internet exposure to left-wing discourse does not, comparatively, have the same radicalizing effect as 
similar exposure to right-wing discourse); Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism Deaths by Ideology: Is Char-
lottesville an Anomaly?, CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017) https://www.cato.org/blog/terrorism-deaths-
ideology-charlottesville-anomaly [https://perma.cc/5EN5-ZWM5] (finding right-wing terrorism to 
have been nearly ten times deadlier than left-wing terrorism between 1992 and 2017). 
 27 See, e.g., Daniel L. Byman, Should We Treat Domestic Terrorists the Way We Treat ISIS?: 
What Works—and What Doesn’t, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 3, 2017) https://www.brookings.edu/
articles/should-we-treat-domestic-terrorists-the-way-we-treat-isis-what-works-and-what-doesnt 
[https://perma.cc/AA4C-W7VP] (using Fields’s attack as a lens to assess the benefits and conse-
quences of expanding terrorism laws to include domestic terrorism, including any expansion’s 
effect on Internet companies). 
 28 See, e.g., Sam Levin, James Damore, Google, and the YouTube Radicalization of Angry 
White Men, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/
13/james-damore-google-memo-youtube-white-men-radicalization [https://perma.cc/7K7M-8H8G] 
(suggesting that YouTube algorithms that redirect viewers of political content to increasingly 
extreme content, some of it terroristic in nature, are responsible for radicalization, and criticizing 
YouTube for not adequately addressing the problem). 
 29 E.g., Richard L. Hason, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 
16 FIRST AM. L. REV. 200, 200 (2017) (arguing for re-examining the First Amendment and enact-
ing regulation or legislation to hold social media companies legally accountable for “fake news” in 
the form of false political advertising); Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sep. 29, 2015) https://beta.techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-
liability-shield [https://perma.cc/VY4D-C8SK] (proposing the repeal of § 230 of the Communica-
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trends in the foreign terror sphere, where several victims of international 
terror attacks have attempted to impose liability on various social media 
companies for allowing terrorists to use their platforms.30 
Domestic terrorism poses a more difficult problem for any potential 
plaintiffs, as the legal framework for enforcing civil anti-terrorism law 
against homegrown terrorists is threadbare compared to its international 
counterpart.31 Furthermore, any proponent of imposing liability on social 
media services or other edge providers for hosting domestic terrorism faces 
the same roadblock as plaintiffs in similar foreign terror suits: § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).32 Section 230 eliminates the con-
cept of vicarious publisher liability for edge providers.33 Offline, publishers 
are liable for the speech of their users, but § 230 prohibits treating edge 
providers as the publishers of user-created content on their platforms.34 Alt-
hough seemingly unassailable in its current form, § 230 currently faces 
congressional challenges that may significantly erode its efficacy as a liabil-
ity shield, which may give rise to lawsuits challenging the breadth of its 
protections.35 
Part I of this Note outlines the federal framework for enforcing anti-
terrorism statutes against domestic terrorists and for creating liability for 
parties who might provide material support to domestic terrorism, including 
                                                                                                                           
tions Decency Act (“CDA”) to allow private civil liability for social media companies whose 
platforms are used to facilitate harassment campaigns); see infra note 30 and accompanying text 
(describing the challenges to the breadth of the CDA, which otherwise barred the plaintiffs from 
suit against tech companies for allegedly supporting terrorism). 
 30 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1154–55 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (dis-
missing an attempt to hold Google liable for materially supporting terrorism where ISIS members 
posted harmful content on Google platforms); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (dismissing an attempt to hold Twitter liable for materially supporting terrorism 
by allowing DFTO group Hamas onto its platform, where American Micah Johnson was allegedly 
radicalized to shoot five Dallas police officers); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 
146 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (dismissing an attempt to hold Facebook liable for materially supporting 
terrorism by allowing Palestine-affiliated groups to “incite, enlist, organize, and dispatch would-be 
killers to ‘slaughter Jews’”). 
 31 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012) (providing a civil remedy for victims of foreign terrorism, but 
not providing the same for victims of domestic terrorism); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (functioning as the 
only law under which material support for domestic terrorism may be prosecuted); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B (permitting criminal prosecution for making donations to designated foreign terror organ-
izations). 
 32 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); see, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1167 (dismissed as 
barred by the CDA); Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 888 (same); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 155 
(same). 
 33 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); Vicarious Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 34 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 35 See, e.g., Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. 
115-164 § 3, 132 Stat. 1253, 1253–54 (creating an exception within § 230 for sex trafficking laws 
such that victims of sex trafficking may hold edge providers civilly liable as the publisher of un-
lawful content). 
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Internet edge providers.36 Part II discusses how both the terrorism frame-
work and § 230 prevent plaintiffs from holding edge providers liable for 
any contribution or provision of material support to domestic terrorist or-
ganizations or attacks.37 Part III explores the consequences of allowing 
plaintiffs to hold edge providers liable for hosting terrorism-related content, 
ultimately proposing moderate alterations to federal terrorism law that leave 
§ 230 intact.38 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOMESTIC TERRORISM  
AND THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY 
A. Domestic Terrorism and Federal Law 
A civil plaintiff attempting to sue any edge provider for hosting do-
mestic terrorism faces not so much an uphill challenge as a ninety-degree 
hike up Mount Everest, and the first peak is finding a definition for “domes-
tic terrorism.”39 Unlike foreign terrorism, domestic terrorist activities are 
defined primarily by who carries them out, rather than by any organizations 
to which those individuals may belong.40 This is because Congress’s statu-
tory definitions provide means to categorize foreign terrorist organizations 
and prosecute them for acts of violence, but do not offer the same tools for 
domestic terrorism.41 Instead, domestic terrorism is statutorily defined by 
the characteristics and context of individual violent activities—specifically, 
illegal dangerous acts conducted in the United States, with the intention of 
intimidating the public, and for the purposes of influencing policy.42 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See infra notes 39–99 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 100–196 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 197–251 and accompanying text. 
 39 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (characterizing domestic terrorism broadly as violent acts 
committed with the intent to influence policy or intimidate the population), with FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN THE POST-9/11 ERA (2009), https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709 [https://perma.cc/XW9L-GK9D] (defin-
ing domestic terrorism as “Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist ideolo-
gies”); see generally infra notes 40–60 and accompanying text. 
 40 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN 
OVERVIEW 4 (2017); see e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333, 2339A, 2339B (drawing consistent legal 
distinctions between domestic terror attacks and foreign terrorist organizations). 
 41 BJELOPERA, supra note 40, at 4; see, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. 104-132 § 219, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012). Section 219 
permits the Secretary of State to designate non-United-States-based extremist groups as Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations. 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Designating a group as a DFTO allows prosecutors 
access to DFTO-specific statutes such as § 2339B, and it also permits the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to freeze the DFTO’s assets. Id. 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (prohibiting “acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States . . . [which] appear to be intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population . . . [in order] to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coer-
cion”). This section’s language tracks with the statutory definition of international terrorism, mi-
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hough U.S. law defines international terrorism in the same terms, U.S. poli-
cy generally regards domestic terrorism as “Americans attacking Americans 
based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies.”43 
Federal law reflects this distinction between foreign terror organiza-
tions and domestic terror threats, creating wrinkles for prosecutors.44 Unlike 
foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism is not actually a federal crime.45 There 
is no specific statute under which domestic terrorism can be prosecuted, 
because, although Congress provided a definition for domestic terrorism in 
the PATRIOT Act at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), the criminal offenses in the Act 
are restricted to acts committed outside the United States against a U.S. na-
tional.46 18 U.S.C. § 2332b offers an enumerated list of federal crimes of 
terrorism, but it applies only to acts that transcend national boundaries.47 In 
the absence of an actual statute for domestic terrorism, when prosecuting a 
domestic terrorist act, prosecutors may instead use enhancement provisions 
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.48 These Guidelines apply when the 
underlying conduct involves the same actions as one of the enumerated ter-
rorism crimes in § 2332(b) (excluding the international component), or if 
                                                                                                                           
nus the requirement that the act transcend national boundaries, and both statutes define terrorism 
through characterization of specific behaviors that ultimately constitute terrorism, rather than list a 
set of an enumerated offenses. Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as 
a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 27 (2006). 
 43 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 39. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B), with 18 
U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B) (defining, with identical language, what constitutes an actor’s intent to terror-
ize). 
 44 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B), with 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B) (using identical language to 
define both domestic and international terrorism). A significant challenge posed by the threat-
based nature of domestic terrorism prosecutions is the difficulty of distinguishing attacks rooted in 
ideology from hate crimes, which, while also driven by ideology, are acts of “personal malice” 
and do not fit the definition of domestic terrorism under § 2331(5). BJELOPERA, supra note 40, at 
4. Because there is no criminal cause of action for domestic terrorism, terrorism is often prosecut-
ed under hate crime statutes, further blurring the line between hate crimes and terrorism. See, e.g., 
United States v. Harpham, No. 2:11-CR-00042-JLQ, 2015 WL 4623717, *1 (E.D. Wa. Aug. 3, 
2015). Kevin Harpham pled guilty to hate crimes and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruc-
tion after he attempted to detonate a bomb during a Martin Luther King, Jr. parade in Spokane, 
Washington. Id. The attack was racially motivated, and authorities continuously characterized his 
actions as terrorism. Id. at *3; Mark F. Giuliano, Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bu-
reau of Investigation, Speech at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Stein Program on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence (Apr. 14, 2011), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/
the-post-9-11-fbi-the-bureaus-response-to-evolving-threats [https://perma.cc/FA63-3PDB]. 
 45 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (requiring as an essential element that terrorist crimes be committed 
by a foreign national or in a foreign country); BJELOPERA, supra note 40, at 4. 
 46 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 § 802(a)(4), 115 Stat. 272, 
376 (2001), 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5); see 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (enumerating several crimes which share 
the core requirement that the act be committed either by a foreign national or in a foreign country). 
 47 18 U.S.C. § 2332b. 
 48 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2016). 
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the conduct was intended to promote terrorism.49 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) recognizes domestic terrorism but often declines to 
refer to actual attacks as such, in part because there is no domestic terror 
statute, but also because publication of such comments would be highly 
prejudicial in domestic courts.50 
There is also no civil remedy for victims of domestic terrorism.51 In 
1992, Congress passed the Federal Courts Administration Act, adding 
§ 2333 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code and creating a civil cause of action for 
U.S. nationals injured by international terrorism.52 Section 2333 functions 
by permitting civil suits against defendants accused of violating any of sev-
eral enumerated criminal anti-terrorism statutes.53 The law’s passage was 
part of an omnibus effort to improve federal courts, including the addition 
of a remedy in a field of law where existing legal systems and jurisdiction 
are both inherently lacking, due to the complex and international nature of 
foreign terrorism.54 Although foreign terror organizations themselves might 
always be out of reach, by creating liability along any part of the “causal 
chain” of terrorism, Congress sought to disrupt the flow of money by target-
ing the finances of its sponsors.55 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See id. (providing enhancements for crimes where the defendant’s actions constitute do-
mestic terrorism); see, e.g., United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d. 994, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the Sentencing Guidelines apply to a conviction when the underlying conduct was 
intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 516 
(6th Cir. 2001) (applying a domestic terrorism sentencing enhancement for broad conspiracy to 
promote terrorism, even though the felony conviction itself was not a terrorism offense as enu-
merated by § 2332). 
 50 Ryan J. Reilly, There’s a Good Reason Feds Don’t Call White Guys Terrorists, Says DOJ 
Domestic Terror Chief, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 1, 2018, 9:32 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/white-terrorists-domestic-extremists_us_5a550158e4b003133ecceb74 [https://perma.
cc/5ZXB-X77V]. As federal prosecutors do not have a blanket statute criminalizing “domestic 
terrorism” under which to prosecute acts that otherwise fall under the § 2331(5) definition, the 
Department of Justice is hesitant to use the term “terrorism” in prosecution for fear that a judge 
might consider it prejudicial. Id. 
 51 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (providing a civil remedy only for victims of foreign terrorism); infra 
notes 52–60 (discussing both the framework of civil remedies for foreign terrorism and the exclu-
sion of domestic terrorism from that framework). 
 52 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, § 1003, Pub. L. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521 
(1992). 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 2333. 
 54 See S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 16, 22, 45 (1992) (justifying the creating of § 2333 when pass-
ing the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992). 
 55 Id. at 22. Congress expanded liability in 2016 by adding a provision which provides a cause 
of action against any person who conspires with anyone who commits an act of international ter-
rorism. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. 114-222 § 4, 130 Stat. 852, 854 
(2016), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d). The purpose of this expansion was to clarify that liability applies to 
anyone who directly or indirectly provides material assistance or support to foreign terror. Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 2. 
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Congress unambiguously, explicitly excluded domestic terrorism from 
its § 2333 civil remedy, but even if it had not been excluded, applying 
§ 2333 in domestic terrorism cases would be very difficult.56 Section 2333 
permits a litigant to use antiterrorism criminal statutes as private causes of 
action, but the vast majority of those statutes criminalize specific acts of 
foreign terrorism.57 The only major criminal terrorism statute that does not 
require an international element is 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which prohibits a 
third party from providing material support to a terror attack.58 Theoretical-
ly, a plaintiff could file a civil action using § 2339A, but because § 2333 
precludes that possibility, the only civil remedies available to victims of 
domestic terror attacks are traditional tort actions.59 Domestic terrorism vic-
tims may commence any applicable tort action, such as wrongful death law-
suits, but they are not entitled to the special awards § 2333 confers (treble 
damages, costs, and attorney’s fees).60 
B. Third-Party Liability in the Terrorism Sphere 
Sections 2339A and 2339B of Title 18 both create third-party liabil-
ity—i.e., liability for parties who provide material support, services, and 
resources to terrorists.61 Although the two statutes were, respectively, sub-
stantially amended and first enacted in response to a domestic terror attack 
(the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing), the law once again distinguishes for-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“Any national of the United States injured by . . . international ter-
rorism . . . may sue therefor . . . .”) (emphasis added); supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text 
(explaining that domestic terrorism is not itself a federal crime that can be prosecuted, and thus 
cannot be a civil cause of action). 
 57 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (creating specific penalties for killing, kidnapping, assaulting, 
etc., when conduct transcends national boundaries); id. § 2339B (prohibiting material support for 
foreign terror organizations). 
 58 Id. § 2339A. Section 2339A does not exclude domestic terrorism, but is instead limited to a 
number of enumerated offenses, some of which have international components. Id. § 32 (prohibit-
ing destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities”), § 37 (prohibiting violence at international air-
ports), § 175 (prohibiting use, possession, or transport of biological weapons), § 229 (prohibiting 
use, possession, or transfer of chemical weapons), § 1114 (prohibiting killing of federal employ-
ees), § 1116 (prohibiting killing of foreign officials), § 1361 (prohibiting damage to government 
property), § 1362 (prohibiting damage to communication infrastructure), § 1992 (prohibiting vio-
lence against mass transportation systems), § 2332f (prohibiting bombings of government, public, 
or infrastructure facilities). 
 59 18 U.S.C. § 2333; see e.g., Complaint, Hurd v. United States, No. 2:16-cv-02409 (D. S.C., 
July 1, 2016) (filing a wrongful death suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 
allowing Charleston church shooter Dylann Roof to obtain the firearm he used when committing 
mass murder). 
 60 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); S. REP. NO. 102-342 at 45; see, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59. 
 61 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. 
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eign terror organizations from general terror threats, providing a more ro-
bust enforcement system against the former.62 
Section 2339B prohibits knowingly providing support or resources to 
any designated foreign terrorist organization (“DFTO”).63 Section 2339A, 
by contrast, is both broader and more narrow: narrowly, it criminalizes 
providing (or concealing the source of) material support or resources know-
ing those resources will be used to carry out an actual terror attack (as op-
posed to supporting an unrelated part of the organization), but more broadly, 
the support is criminal regardless of the attacker’s affiliation.64 In essence, 
under § 2339A, a third party is criminally liable for providing material sup-
port to a domestic terrorist attack, but not to a domestic terrorist organiza-
tion.65 
Despite § 2339A’s origin in homegrown terrorism, third parties culpa-
ble under § 2339A for providing support to domestic attacks are rarely 
prosecuted as such.66 Since the September 11th al-Qaeda attacks, the FBI 
has focused its domestic investigation efforts almost exclusively on self-
radicalizing individuals associated with Islamic jihadi terrorism.67 Of the 
forty-five cases the Department of Justice prosecuted under § 2339A be-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 
§ 120005, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. Section 2339A was initially 
passed as part of a broad crime bill unrelated to terrorism in 1994. Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act § 120005. Less than a year later, motivated by U.S. right-wing extremism, 
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols detonated a truck bomb in downtown Oklahoma City, kill-
ing 168 Americans in what remains the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in American history. Jo 
Thomas, McVeigh Guilty on All Counts in the Oklahoma City Bombing; Jury to Weigh Death 
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/03/us/mcveigh-guilty-all-
counts-oklahoma-city-bombing-jury-weigh-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/8XLM-TZ7Q]. 
In response, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) 
which amended § 2339A, added § 2339B, and added the Designated Foreign Terror Organization 
(“DFTO”) designation process. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 303; H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-383, at 37 (1995). Both sections were later strengthened and clarified by the USA 
PATRIOT Act, passed after the September 11th al-Qaeda attacks. USA PATRIOT Act § 215. 
 63 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (providing that “[w]hoever knowingly provides material support 
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization . . . shall be . . . imprisoned . . . ,” with the limitation 
that such “a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organiza-
tion”). 
 64 Id. § 2339A(a) (“Whoever provides material support or resources . . . knowing or intending 
that they are to be used in preparation for . . . a violation of [enumerated offenses] shall be impris-
oned . . . .”). There are several dozen enumerated federal offenses considered terroristic in nature. 
See id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Scott Sullivan, Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism as Terrorism, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 
18, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44274/prosecuting-domestic-terrorism-terrorism [https://
perma.cc/4NF8-NDAJ] (reporting only two federal prosecutions for material support of domestic 
terrorism between 2012 and 2017). 
 67 Id.; see Giuliano, supra note 44 (characterizing homegrown Islamic radical extremism as 
one of the United States’ greatest domestic threats and one of the FBI’s top priorities). 
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tween 2012 and 2017, only two defendants were not sympathizers of trans-
national jihadi terror groups.68 
The final distinction between domestic and international terror materi-
al support law is that there is no civil remedy for providing material support 
to domestic terrorists.69 Section 2333 may permit bringing suit against vio-
lators of either § 2339A or § 2339B, but, as discussed above, § 2333 per-
mits suits only for victims of international terrorism.70 Absent any future 
congressional action, liable parties in domestic terror attacks may only be 
prosecuted by the government.71 As these are criminal offenses, the gov-
ernment must prove every element, from knowledge to whether support is 
“material” to the underlying offense, beyond a reasonable doubt.72 
To be convicted under § 2339A, a defendant must provide material 
support to a terrorist while knowing that it will be used to commit one of 
several offenses enumerated in the statute, and the perpetrator of the act 
itself must harbor ideology and motive such that it fulfills § 2331(5)’s defi-
nition of domestic terrorism.73 Conspiring and attempting to provide sup-
port or resources is also a violation of § 2339A, as is concealing or disguis-
ing the origin or nature of support.74 “Material support” for the felonies 
enumerated in both § 2339A and § 2339B includes the provision of proper-
ty, services, facilities, personnel, equipment, or transportation.75 Material 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Sullivan, supra note 66. Jihadi terrorism prosecutions did not always dominate the federal 
docket; before 2001, material support prosecutions in domestic terror cases were not uncommon. See, 
e.g., David Johnston, 7 in Paramilitary Group Arrested in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/12/us/7-in-paramilitary-group-arrested-in-west-virginia.
html [https://perma.cc/53H2-RERA] (reporting a material support prosecution against members of 
a white nationalist paramilitary group called the Mountaineer Militia); Militia Head Jailed on 
Bomb Plot Charges, L.A. TIMES (Dec 9, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/09/news/mn-
42054 [https://perma.cc/GD56-WV8F] (reporting a material support prosecution against the leader 
of a white nationalist militia coalition called the Southeastern States Alliance). 
 69 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2339A, 2339B; CHARLES DOYLE, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., R41333, 
TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. § 2339A AND § 2339B, at 12 
(2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41333.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC2G-MEMA]. 
 70 See DOYLE, supra note 69. 
 71 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333; id. § 2339A. 
 72 Id. § 2339A; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (cementing the reasonable doubt 
standard in American criminal jurisprudence). 
 73 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(5), 2339A. 
 74 Id. § 2339A. The offenses enumerated in § 2339A include (1) destruction of aircraft or 
airports; (2) possession of biological or chemical weapons; (3) possession of plastic explosives; 
(4) perpetrating several forms of violence on federal lands, against federal property, or against 
federal officials acting in their capacities; (5) bombing places of public use or interstate com-
merce; and (6) sabotaging mass transportation or communication systems. Id. §§ 32, 37, 175, 229, 
1114, 1116, 1361, 1362, 1992, 2332f. 
 75 Id. §§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4). The full text of both sections defines material support as, 
“any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, 
false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal sub-
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support charges have rapidly become the most common vehicle for terror-
ism prosecutions, present in 69.4% of cases in 2010 (up from 11.6% in 
2001).76 As of 2017 material support is the most common charge in federal 
terrorism prosecutions.77 
Unlike § 2339B, which has an express knowledge requirement, 
§ 2339A does not expressly require a defendant to have known that the ma-
terial support they provided would be used in a terrorist attack, only that the 
provided support could foreseeably be used in one.78 Consequently, the 
knowledge requirement for material support is broader than that of 
§ 2339B.79 To be guilty under § 2339A, a defendant must have known that 
they provided material support to an actor, but needs only to be deliberately 
indifferent to, or have reckless disregard for, the consequences of that sup-
port.80 In Boim v. Holy Land Foundation, the Seventh Circuit famously held 
that when a defendant donated funds to Hamas—a Palestinian political or-
ganization designated as a DFTO—despite the donation being earmarked 
for Hamas to perform educational outreach, Hamas’ use of those funds to 
kill an American national in an overseas terror attack was a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of that donation, and the defendant was therefore 
criminally liable under § 2339A and civilly liable under § 2333.81 Accord-
ingly, it is typically sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant ex-
hibited reckless disregard for the harm resulting from their provision of 
support, rather than actual knowledge of or intent to harm.82 
                                                                                                                           
stances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” Id. 
§§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4). 
 76 CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEP-
TEMBER 11, 2001—SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, at 21 (2011), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK2F-PX3X]. 
 77 Domestic Terrorism Prosecutions Outnumber International, TRAC REPORTS (Sept. 21, 
2017) http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/481 [https://perma.cc/BL7S-YD7J]. 
 78 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (lacking an express knowledge requirement), with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B (requiring express knowledge); see Boim v. Holy Land Found., 549 F.3d 685, 691, 693–
94 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding liability under § 2339A because the defendant’s donation being used to 
support a terrorist act was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that donation, despite the de-
fendant’s lack of knowledge or intent). 
 79 Boim, 549 F.3d at 693–94 (finding liability under § 2339A because it was reasonably fore-
seeable that the defendant’s donation would be used to support a terrorist act). Compare 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A, with 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
 80 Boim, 549 F.3d at 693–94; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 21–22 
(2010) (holding that training members of a terrorist organization in peacekeeping still falls within 
the statute’s definition of “training” and is thus considered material support). 
 81 Boim, 549 F.3d at 693–94; U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterror-
ism, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 195, 52650 (Oct. 8, 1997), https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1997-10-08/pdf/97-27030.pdf (designating Hamas as a DFTO). 
 82 See, e.g., Gill v. Arab Bank, 893 F. Supp. 2d, 474, 505–06 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding, in 
agreement with the Seventh Circuit, that culpability under § 2339A does not require actual 
knowledge or intent). 
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When civil litigation is commenced under § 2339A, in addition to the 
requisite state of mind, a plaintiff must also prove that causation existed 
between a defendant’s provision of material support and the instant harm.83 
The provision need not be the actual cause of an attack, but it must still be a 
proximate cause, meaning the harm must have been reasonably foreseea-
ble.84 In Boim, the court held that because it was foreseeable that the funds 
would go to terror activities and the contribution actually allowed Hamas to 
fund those activities, the plaintiff had established causation.85 Both § 2339A 
and § 2339B contain this causation requirement, but litigation predicated on 
§ 2339B fails more commonly on causation than § 2339A litigation.86 Civil 
suits require an actual harm, proximately caused by the defendant’s ac-
tions.87 Proving that harm in § 2339B suits is more difficult because 
§ 2339B expressly prohibits providing support to an organization, not a 
specific event.88 A civil plaintiff alleging harm must therefore show that 
providing the organization with material support proximately caused the 
actual, specific harm.89 By contrast, § 2339A concerns supporting a discrete 
act, which by nature of the allegation is less attenuated and thus more easily 
proven.90 
The causation standards in § 2339A and § 2339B have proven them-
selves consistent roadblocks for plaintiffs attempting to hold edge providers 
liable for providing their platforms to terrorists.91 There is, however, anoth-
er substantial obstacle that has resulted in dismissal of almost every materi-
al support suit filed against edge providers: § 230 of the CDA.92 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Boim, 549 F.3d at 695–96. 
 84 Id. at 697–98. 
 85 Id. at 698. 
 86 See, e.g., Fields v. Twitter, Inc. (Fields III), 881 F.3d 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismiss-
ing a suit for lack of proximate cause between ISIS’s use of Twitter generally and the actions of 
the person who perpetrated the attack but never himself made use of Twitter). 
 87 Id. at 748. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the material 
support conviction of an attorney for passing along a message directly connected to a terrorist act). 
In Stewart, the court upheld the § 2339A conviction of Lynne Stewart, an ex-attorney who had 
helped her then-client Omar Abdel-Rahman, a perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ings, pass along messages from prison. Id. at 99, 101. Rahman’s supporters had asked for his ad-
vice on whether to ignore a ceasefire with the Egyptian government and resume violence, and 
Stewart passed along a message that he had “no objection” to ignoring the ceasefire. Id. at 99, 107. 
 91 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (dismissed for lack of causation); Pennie, 281 F. 
Supp. 3d at 874 (same); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (same). 
 92 See Eric Goldman, Seventh Different Lawsuit Against Social Media Providers for “Materi-
al Support to Terrorists” Fails—Taamneh v. Twitter, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 31, 
2018) https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/10/seventh-different-lawsuit-against-social-media-
providers-for-material-support-for-terrorists-fails-taamneh-v-twitter.htm [https://perma.cc/FFU9-
XPNB] [hereinafter Goldman, Seventh Lawsuit]; infra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
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C. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
Congress passed Section 230 as part of Title V of the 1996 Telecom-
munications Act.93 Title V, also known as the Communications Decency 
Act, was an indecency and obscenity law intended to regulate online por-
nography.94 While the Supreme Court eventually struck down the majority 
of the CDA as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment, § 230 
survived.95 
Section 230 prohibits plaintiffs from treating “provider[s] . . . of an in-
teractive computer service” as publishers or speakers of content that is pro-
duced by someone else but hosted on the provider’s platform.96 This prohi-
bition encompasses both edge providers like Google and Facebook as well 
as Internet service providers (ISPs) that provide broadband or other compa-
rable access to the Internet.97 The CDA’s reach is broad, and that breadth 
has survived challenges ranging from failure of an ISP to provide a nondis-
criminatory place of public accommodation, to trademark claims of unfair 
competition, and, most relevantly, to tort claims.98 The CDA does not apply 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 (1996), 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 94 Id. 
 95 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (finding the majority of the Act to be an 
impermissible content-based restriction on speech, but finding § 230 content neutral and thus 
leaving it intact). 
 96 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 97 Id.; see, e.g., Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(holding that Facebook fits the definition of an “interactive computer service” and is therefore 
immune under § 230 from suits stemming from content on the Facebook platform); Goddard v. 
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim that Google 
supported fraudulent advertising was barred by the CDA); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 
F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that TimeWarner Cable also fits the statutory definition 
and is similarly immune from suit). 
 98 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding immunity for 
edge provider CCBill in a trademark claim); Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319 (D. 
N.J. 2015) (finding immunity for an edge provider Grindr in tort suit); Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 
532 (finding immunity for TimeWarner in nondiscrimination suit). In Saponaro, the court found 
that the CDA barred a negligence suit against online dating app Grindr for allegedly permitting a 
thirteen-year-old minor to misrepresent his age. 93 F. Supp. 3d at 321. Allegedly believing the 
underage user was of consenting age, the plaintiff had organized and performed a “threesome” 
with him. Police subsequently arrested the plaintiff and charged him with sexual assault. Id. In 
Perfect 10, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s trademark and unfair competition claims as barred 
by the CDA. 488 F.3d at 1108. The plaintiff, Perfect 10, published an adult entertainment maga-
zine and operated a parallel subscription-based online service, the content of which was often 
pirated by rival subscription services. Id. CCBill, the defendant, is an online payment service that 
allows customers to pay for, among other things, online subscriptions. Id. Perfect 10 alleged that 
the webmasters with whom CCBill contracted had pirated their content, and by failing to monitor 
the services, CCBill was liable for violating Perfect 10’s trademarks. Id. In Noah, the court held 
that broadband ISP AOL TimeWarner was immune from a suit alleging discrimination. 261 F. 
Supp. at 534. The plaintiff, a Muslim, claimed that AOL violated his right to a nondiscriminatory 
place of public accommodation by permitting users to post harassing messages in its chatrooms. 
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to criminal law or enforcement, and thus the government may prosecute a 
computer service as the publisher of its content.99 
II. OBSTACLES TO IMPOSING LIABILITY ON THIRD PARTIES 
Domestic terrorism is indisputably a problem in the United States, and 
while national attention focuses predominantly on radical Islamist terror, 
far-right white supremacist and anti-government terror attacks are no less 
common than those perpetrated by jihadists.100 Between 2001 and 2015, 
right-wing extremists carried out nineteen lethal attacks and killed twice as 
many people as Muslim extremists, who only carried out seven lethal at-
tacks.101 Groups that radicalize attackers are also becoming more common; 
the Southern Poverty Law Center reports an increase in active hate groups 
from 457 in 1999 to 917 in 2016.102 This rise is attributable at least in part 
to the advent of the Internet and of social media, which has enabled the 
flourishing of echo chambers accessible to anyone worldwide with a broad-
band connection.103 
                                                                                                                           
Id. The respective courts dismissed them all. Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1102; Saponaro, 93 F. Supp. 
3d at 319; Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
 99 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (distinguishing civil liability from criminal liability and stating that 
the statute shall have no effect on any federal criminal statute). 
 100 Bergen et al., supra note 13. 
 101 Id. This survey found that jihadists were responsible for the deaths of twenty-six people 
during this same time period, while right-wing extremists killed forty-eight. Id. The survey ex-
cluded any attacks that were not clearly tied to ideology. Id. This survey also predates the 2015 
San Bernardino shooting and 2017 Pulse nightclub shooting, both perpetrated by self-proclaimed 
jihadists. See Alan Blinder, Frances Robles & Richard Pérez-Peña, Omar Mateen Posted to Face-
book Amid Orlando Attack, Lawmaker Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/17/us/orlando-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/4XNG-FP3N] (reporting that Pulse 
nightclub shooter Omar Mateen had sworn allegiance to the Islamic State before and during the 
attack); Pete Williams & Halimah Abdullah, FBI: San Bernardino Shooters Radicalized Before 
They Met, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015, 1:42 PM) https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-
shooting/fbi-san-bernardino-shooters-radicalized-they-met-n476971 [https://perma.cc/AD8H-KWXD] 
(reporting on then-FBI Director James Comey’s testimony that both San Bernardino shooters had 
self-radicalized in 2013). 
 102 Hate Map, supra note 12; see Bergen et al., supra note 13. Black separatist and far-left 
extremist groups have also increased their activity, but violent acts are comparatively rare. See 
Bergen et al., supra note 13 (documenting the sharp rise of far-right deadly attacks between 2000 
and 2018). 
 103 See, e.g., INES VON BEHR ET AL., RAND CORP. EUROPE, RADICALISATION IN THE DIGI-
TAL ERA: THE USE OF THE INTERNET IN 15 CASES OF TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM 17 (2013) 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2P7-24CS] (concluding that the Internet provides greater opportunities for 
radicalization and, while not the sole cause, acts as an “accelerant” in the process); Kieron O’Hara 
& David Stevens, Echo Chambers and Online Radicalism: Assessing the Internet’s Complicity in 
Violent Extremism, 7 POL’Y & INTERNET 4, 401, 402–03 (2015) (evaluating the harm—or lack 
thereof—of Internet echo chambers, given their pervasiveness); Thompson, supra note 15, at 168 
(studying the impact of social media in particular on the radicalization process). 
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Given the considerable increase in both active hate groups and ideo-
logically motivated violence over the past twenty years, it is not surprising 
that social and legal scholars are in search of solutions.104 As the Internet 
has been instrumental in radicalization, it is also not surprising that pro-
posed solutions sometimes center around platforms that host extremist and 
terrorist content, from large edge providers like Twitter to domain name 
registration services like GoDaddy.105 Several terror victims have filed suits 
against Twitter, Facebook, and Google, attempting to actualize calls to hold 
tech companies responsible for the user speech on their platforms.106 Thus 
far, this has not proven a fruitful endeavor.107 
This Section explores the challenges of prosecuting or litigating do-
mestic terror within the current legal framework. 108 Part A discusses how, 
even without the CDA, federal terrorism law precludes imposing liability 
on edge providers who would provide material support to acts of domestic 
terrorism.109 Part B explores § 230 of the CDA in greater detail, including 
the immunities it confers to edge providers, dismissed and pending lawsuits 
attacking it, and current legislative threats to its existence.110 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Hate Map, supra note 12; Bergen et al., supra note 13 (detailing the increase in hate 
groups and hate-motivated violence); see, e.g., Anti-Semitism Awareness Act of 2016, S.10, 114th 
Cong. § 4 (2016) (proposing a bill that would expand the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include anti-
Semitism and therefore expand the breadth of speech that can precipitate a civil rights investiga-
tion); Suzanne Nossel, The Problem with Making Hate Speech Illegal, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 14, 
2017, 2:00 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/14/the-problem-with-making-hate-speech-
illegal-trump-charlottesville-virginia-nazi-white-nationalist-supremacist [https://perma.cc/MT25-
QTA7] (arguing that outlawing hate speech is not an appropriate legal solution). 
 105 See, e.g., Byman, supra note 27 (discussing GoDaddy’s history of providing domain 
names for white nationalist content); Noah Kulwin, Twitter Is Still Trying and Failing to Solve Its 
White Supremacy Problem, VICE NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/
gydda7/twitter-is-still-trying-and-failing-to-solve-its-white-supremacy-problem [https://perma.cc/
Q499-QZJ8] (documenting and criticizing Twitter’s failure to remove white supremacists from its 
platform); Heather Stewart & Jessica Elgot, May Calls on Social Media Giants to Do More to 
Tackle Terrorism, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/
jan/24/theresa-may-calls-on-social-media-giants-to-do-more-to-tackle-terrorism [https://perma.
cc/UTA2-7KHE] (reporting on British Prime Minister Theresa May’s request for shareholders to 
pressure social media companies to combat terrorism). 
 106 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Pennie v. 
Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, (N.D. Cal. 2017); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 
140 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (dismissing all as barred under the CDA). 
 107 Demetrick Pennie, Section 230 of the CDA Must Align with the 21st Century, LAW360 
(July 26, 2017, 12:40pm) https://www.law360.com/articles/947856/section-230-of-the-cda-must-
align-with-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/2EAN-DEPT] (encouraging limiting legal road-
blocks to open social media companies up to liability in response to domestic terror attacks). 
 108 See infra notes 111–196 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 111–143 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 144–196 and accompanying text. 
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A. Structural Limitations to Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism 
The first obstacle to any kind of anti-terrorism enforcement is that no 
federal agency has wholesale regulatory authority over companies that pro-
vide platforms for user content.111 While the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) regulates broadcast, its authority over the Internet 
extends only to network service providers (such as Comcast)—and that au-
thority is ancillary at best.112 The FCC cannot provide civil remedies, nor 
can it mandate that service providers turn over account information to law 
enforcement agencies or shut down accounts or websites.113 Edge providers 
like social media websites fall under the purview of the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), whose jurisdiction over the Internet extends only to 
consumer protection, not content regulation.114 
In the absence of regulatory authority or congressional action, an alter-
native means of moderating terrorist content on the Internet may lie in the 
courtroom.115 The construction of terror laws, however, leaves little room 
for even prosecution of domestic terrorists themselves, much less any third 
party who may have provided material support to a domestic terrorist.116 
The first crime to be pursued as an act of domestic terror under Attor-
ney General Jefferson Sessions’s Department of Justice occurred on January 
17th, 2018, when Taylor Michael Wilson was indicted on domestic terror-
ism charges for hijacking and attempting to crash an Amtrak train.117 Wil-
                                                                                                                           
 111 See John Eggerton, Lax FTC Edge Enforcement Has Left ‘Gaping’ Hole, BROADCASTING 
CABLE (May 7, 2018) https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/netcompetition-lax-ftc-edge-
enforcement-left-gaping-hole [https://perma.cc/6SUR-BTTQ] (discussing various federal agen-
cies’ limited jurisdiction over content on the Internet). 
 112 Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 47 C.F.R. 
§§ 8, 20) (2019) (ordering the reclassification of the Internet to a Title I information service, strip-
ping the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) of most regulatory authority in favor of a 
light-touch framework); Mario Trujillo, FCC Says It Can’t Shut Down ISIS Websites, THE HILL 
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/260438-fcc-says-it-cant-shutdown-online-
terrorist-activity [https://perma.cc/2KTF-XKDH]; see also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 733–34 (1978) (upholding the FCC’s authority to promulgate indecency regulations for 
broadcast television). In a congressional hearing, former FCC chairman Tom Wheeler expressed 
both belief that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to target individual websites, and also disinterest 
in pursuing it. Trujillo, supra. 
 113 Trujillo, supra note 112. 
 114 Eggerton, supra note 111; see, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–728 (authorizing the FTC to promulgate and enforce rules 
limiting websites from collecting data of children under thirteen). 
 115 See, e.g., Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 564, 570 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (attempting 
to hold Twitter liable for hosting terrorism). 
 116 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012) (criminalizing providing material support to DFTOs). 
 117 Complaint, United States v. Wilson, No. 4:18-cr-03005, 1 (D. Neb. 2018); see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1992 (criminalizing terrorist attacks against railroads or other mass transportation carriers); Eric 
Levenson, Neo-Nazi Charged with Terrorism in Attempt to Wreck Amtrak Train, Complaint Says, 
CNN (Jan. 17, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/09/us/nazi-white-supremacist-amtrak-
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son, who had previously participated in the Charlottesville rally, boarded an 
Amtrak train with a fully loaded revolver on October 22nd, 2017, and trig-
gered an emergency stop, allegedly intending to harm the passengers.118 
During his arrest, not only did the police who searched him uncover a gas 
mask, a knife, ammunition, and several speed loaders for the revolver, po-
lice also discovered that Wilson was carrying business cards for the Nation-
al Socialist Movement (“NSM”), a neo-Nazi organization.119 During the 
investigation, Wilson’s cousin informed police that Wilson had inadvertent-
ly connected with the NSM when researching forums online.120 
If the NSM were classified as a DFTO and Wilson was a member of 
the NSM, any victim of Wilson’s violence would have a civil cause of ac-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against anyone who provided material support 
to the NSM as a whole, not just against Wilson himself.121 But because the 
NSM is a domestic hate group, victims of the attack cannot pursue any 
claims against supporters of the NSM, and they must restrict all claims to 
third parties who supported Wilson directly.122 The government has similar-
ly limited recourse, restricted to prosecuting only Wilson himself (or sup-
porters specifically of Wilson) for his specific enumerated offenses—in this 
case, hijacking a train—instead of the broader category of people who sup-
port the NSM as a whole.123 
Attaching civil liability to third parties for providing material support 
to domestic terrorists is not possible by statute, but criminally prosecuting 
third parties for providing material support to domestic terrorists is, alt-
hough possible, not much easier.124 Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which estab-
lishes criminal liability for supporting foreign terror organizations, 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A—the only law establishing liability against domestic terror-
ists—applies only to parties who provide support for an actual act of ter-
                                                                                                                           
terrorism-arrest-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/HJ83-3LLK] (confirming that Wilson was in at-
tendance at Unite the Right). 
 118 Complaint, supra note 117, at 10; Levenson, supra note 117. 
 119 Levenson, supra note 117. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333(d)(2), 2339B(a)(1) (“Whoever knowingly provides material sup-
port or resources to a foreign terrorist organization . . . shall be . . . imprisoned . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). Of course, any plaintiff would still have to prove a causal nexus between the defendant’s 
support of the NSM and the harm of the attack. Boim v. Holy Land Found., 549 F.3d 685, 691, 
693–94 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 122 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333. 
 123 See id. §§ 2331(5), 2332B. 
 124 See id. § 2339A (criminalizing providing material support to a terrorist act, not excluding 
domestic terrorist acts); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (barring holding a computer service liable as the speaker 
for the content it publishes, but creating an exception for criminal prosecutions); infra notes 125–
135 and accompanying text. 
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ror.125 The CDA notwithstanding, edge providers who knowingly and inten-
tionally host members of DFTOs on their platforms could theoretically be 
held liable for materially supporting them under § 2339B, but if the organi-
zation is homegrown, providers evade liability.126 
One example of a third party whose provision of a platform would 
otherwise constitute providing support to terrorist organizations (as opposed 
to a terrorist attack) is IronMarch.org.127 Vanguard America, the organiza-
tion with which James Fields marched in Charlottesville, traces its roots to 
IronMarch.org.128 IronMarch.org is a message board that has spawned a 
number of far-right white supremacist groups, including “Atomwaffen Di-
vision,” a fascist paramilitary neo-Nazi organization.129 Atomwaffen was 
founded in 2015 and announced its creation on IronMarch.org, but most 
                                                                                                                           
 125 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B; see BJELOPERA, supra note 40, at 57–58 (explaining that 
there are no specific terrorism statutes under which domestic terrorists can be prosecuted—with 
the exception of § 2339A). 
 126 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (“Whoever provides material support or resources . . . 
knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for . . . a violation of [enumerated 
offenses] shall be imprisoned . . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (providing for the imprison-
ment of anyone who “knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist or-
ganization,” but requiring that the “person must have knowledge that the organization is a desig-
nated terrorist organization”). 
 127 See Welcome to Hate Planet, supra note 23 (providing forum space targeted to paramili-
tary organizations like Atomwaffen, whose members perpetrated several violent attacks on Amer-
icans); infra notes 129–135 (describing the terrorist nature of Atomwaffen and the crimes commit-
ted by Atomwaffen members). The IronMarch.org website was recently taken down for unverifia-
ble reasons by its owner, neo-Nazi Alisher Mukhitdinov, who was allegedly romantically involved 
with an Illinois woman who was arrested in 2015 for planning to commit a mass shooting in Nova 
Scotia. Fascist Forge: A New Forum for Hate, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE NEVADA (Jan. 15, 
2019) https://lasvegas.adl.org/fascist-forge-a-new-forum-for-hate [http://perma.cc/QRY9-MWT8?
type=image]; Illinois Woman with Neo-Nazi Leanings Charged in Canadian Mass Murder Plot, S. 
POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/02/18/illinois-
woman-neo-nazi-leanings-charged-canadian-mass-murder-plot [https://perma.cc/G4HT-VK2U] 
(citing Artard, Lindsay Kantha Souvannarath / Heretics on Holiday - Failed Halifax Mass Shooter 
& Asian Nazi Fetishist, KIWI FARMS (Feb. 14, 2015), https://kiwifarms.net/threads/lindsay-kantha-
souvannarath-heretics-on-holiday.7744/page-2 [https://perma.cc/G5NE-NBK8]) [hereinafter Illi-
nois Woman]. She and her two co-conspirators all made use of Nazi iconography in their social 
media posts. Illinois Woman, supra. 
 128 Meet ‘Patriot Front’: Neo-Nazi Network Aims to Blur Lines with Militiamen, the Alt-
Right, S. POVERTY L. CTR., (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/12/11/
meet-patriot-front-neo-nazi-network-aims-blur-lines-militiamen-alt-right [https://perma.cc/F3US-
Y33K] (hereinafter Meet Patriot Front). 
 129 Meet Patriot Front, supra note 128. Unlike many far-right extremist organizations, Atom-
waffen actively embraces Nazi iconography and fascist rhetoric. A.C. Thompson et al., California 
Murder Suspect Said to Have Trained with Extremist Hate Group, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 26, 2018, 7:46 
PM) https://www.propublica.org/article/california-murder-suspect-atomwaffen-division-extremist-
hate-group [https://perma.cc/8TRM-D85T]. The organization deliberately brands itself with Third 
Reich imagery, and members have posted videos online of themselves burning the Constitution 
and American flag. Id. Members also attend paramilitary training camps where they are trained in 
survival skills, firearms, and hand-to-hand combat. Id. 
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recently came to prominence in May of 2017 when Brandon Russell, one of 
its members, was arrested in Tampa, Florida after his roommate, Devon Ar-
thurs, shot and killed their other two roommates.130 All four of them were 
also Atomwaffen members.131 Russell himself was found in possession of 
highly explosive compounds after police detected radioactivity in the 
apartment and he was accused by Arthurs of plotting to destroy electric 
power lines in South Florida and detonate explosive devices at a Miami nu-
clear power plant.132 
Destruction of energy facilities, possession of nuclear material, and 
possession of chemical explosives are three of the enumerated offenses 
covered by § 2339A and § 2339B.133 Were Atomwaffen a DFTO, and thus 
under the purview of § 2339B, IronMarch.org, which actively courted neo-
Nazi violent fascism, would likely be liable for providing them with materi-
al support.134 Section 2339A, on the other hand, would only permit liability 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Thompson et al., supra note 129; Adam Thorp, Militant Neo-Nazi Group Claims Credit 
for Hanging Hitler Portrait, Swastikas on Campus Building, CHI. MAROON (Dec. 5, 2016, 6:15 
PM) https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2016/12/6/militant-neo-nazi-group-claims-credit-
hanging-hitl [https://perma.cc/EB9C-G8DX]. 
 131 Niraj Chokshi, Neo-Nazi Leader in Florida Sentenced to 5 Years Over Homemade Explo-
sives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/us/brandon-russell-
sentenced-neo-nazi.html [https://perma.cc/T4NK-U3YL]; Thompson et al., supra note 129. 
Atomwaffen made news even more recently when member Samuel Woodward was charged in 
California with the murder of Blaze Bernstein, a student at the University of Pennsylvania. See 
Thompson et al., supra note 129. The prosecution is ongoing, but Woodward has been photo-
graphed and identified with Atomwaffen members and has engaged in guerilla training since 
2016. Id. In his social media accounts, he describes himself as a National Socialist. Id. Bernstein, 
the victim, was gay and Jewish, and prosecutors are treating the murder as a hate crime. Id. 
 132 Chokshi, supra note 131; Dan Sullivan, National Guard ‘Neo-Nazi’ Aimed to Hit Miami 
Nuclear Plant, Roommate Says, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 13, 2017), http://www.tampabay.com/
news/courts/criminal/judge-sets-release-conditions-for-neo-nazi-in-tampa-palms-explosives-case/
2327088 [https://perma.cc/PU27-PY6K]. After pleading guilty in federal district court, Russell 
was sentenced to five years in federal prison for possession of homemade explosives, though he 
was not charged as a domestic terrorist. Chokshi, supra note 131. 
 133 18 U.S.C. §§ 229, 831, 1366. 
 134 Id. § 2339B; Meet Patriot Front, supra note 129. IronMarch.org, is an online forum in-
tended to appeal to white nationalists interested in militarizing; see Boim, 549 F.3d at 693–94 
(holding a third party liable even though he earmarked donations to Hamas specifically for educa-
tional funds because Hamas using those funds for terrorism was reasonably foreseeable). Meet 
Patriot Front, supra note 129; Welcome to Hate Planet, supra note 23. After this incident gained 
wide notoriety and the organization’s existence filtered into mainstream media coverage, Atom-
waffen grew in size, but many of its members also joined Vanguard America, the group with 
which James Fields marched in Charlottesville. Meet Patriot Front, supra note 129. Similarly, 
after Fields’s attack, Vanguard America drew attention to itself, and, much like the fallout of the 
Atomwaffen arrests, many members of Vanguard America spun off to form a new organization, 
Patriot Front. Id. Patriot Front’s mission statement is to transcend online discussion and carry the 
group’s neo-Nazi ideology into real-world activism, which thus far has included disseminating 
flyers advertising their online presence and explicitly advocating fascism and “reconquering 
[one’s] birthright” of the white ethnostate. See @PatriotFront, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/patriot
front2?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/2G6W-3YZJ]. Patriot Front is also responsible for several har-
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for IronMarch.org if its hosting of Atomwaffen’s content and userbase was a 
proximate cause of the attacks themselves.135 
Although it is difficult to conceive of a plausible fact pattern in which 
a social media company (1) provides a platform to a homegrown extremist 
who (2) uses it to commit an act that (3) fits within both the definition of 
terrorism and the enumerated felonies that can be prosecuted as terrorism, it 
is not impossible.136 One possible fact pattern arose in 2016, when “sover-
eign citizens” movement member Ammon Bundy led a group of armed mil-
itants to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, a federal wildlife preserve 
in Western Oregon, and occupied the lands for over four weeks.137 Bundy 
and his militia made demands for the federal government to both cede its 
claim to the land and release prisoners who had committed arson under sim-
ilar ideological justifications, and claimed they were willing to “kill and be 
killed” if necessary.138 Before the occupation, Bundy had rallied support 
and coordinated his march by posting calls to arms online, including videos 
posted on Facebook, YouTube, and the organization’s independently hosted 
website.139 Although Bundy and his co-conspirators were not charged with 
                                                                                                                           
assment campaigns on college campuses across the country, and its founder, eighteen-year-old 
Thomas Rousseau, incidentally marched next to Fields in Charlottesville. Meet Patriot Front, 
supra note 129. Rousseau was radicalized on IronMarch.org. Meet Patriot Front, supra note 129. 
 135 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; see Boim, 549 F.3d at 693–94 (requiring proximate cause between the 
provision of material support and the instant harm in order to find liability); see, e.g., Fields v. 
Twitter, Inc. (Fields II), 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that ISIS’s use of 
Twitter as an organization could not plausibly be considered a proximate cause of the shooting of 
five Dallas police officers, because the gunman was not himself a Twitter user), aff’d, Fields III, 
881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 136 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(5), 2339A. 
 137 Les Zaits, Militia Takes Over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters, THE ORE-
GONIAN, (Jan. 2, 2016, 9:15 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/
2016/01/drama_in_burns_ends_with_quiet.html [https://perma.cc/5W2E-6SJK]. The “sovereign 
citizens” movement is an association of right-wing antigovernment fringe groups who reject taxa-
tion, currency, and the rule of law under the theory that, when the United States was founded, the 
founding fathers intended a system of common law wherein individual citizens would be “sover-
eign,” but at some point in American history this legal system was replaced by a system of admi-
ralty law which enslaves its citizens. Sovereign Citizens Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://
www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement [https://
perma.cc/3A68-9TY7]. 
 138 Zaits, supra note 137; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eastern Oregon Ranchers 
Convicted of Arson Resentenced to Five Years in Prison (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.
gov/usao-or/pr/eastern-oregon-ranchers-convicted-arson-resentenced-five-years-prison [https://
perma.cc/YW2K-3BXV] (announcing the conviction of the arsonists and their sentencing under 
antiterrorism statutes); Siobhan Fenton, Oregon Occupation: Militia ‘Willing to Kill or Be Killed’ 
Occupy US Wildlife Reserve, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/oregon-occupation-militia-willing-to-kill-or-be-killed-occupy-us-wildlife-reserve-
a6794366.html [https://perma.cc/WL3N-RX6X] (reporting Ryan Bundy’s statement of violent 
intent to journalists). 
 139 See, e.g., Bundy Ranch, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/bundyranch/videos/93748
7166328092 [https://perma.cc/T7MR-BHYN (archiving the Facebook page), https://perma.cc/
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domestic terrorism, their actions—armed occupation of a federal facility for 
the purpose of influencing government policy, resulting in one death—
could theoretically fit within the scope of crimes for which § 2339A prohib-
its providing material support.140 Should that be the case, it is incontroverti-
ble that the videos and other content hosted by edge providers such as Fa-
cebook were used for planning an act of domestic terror.141 If hosting this 
content were to qualify as material support, Facebook would be criminally 
liable under § 2339A for providing material support in preparation for a 
terrorist attack.142 As there is no civil remedy for domestic terrorism, Face-
book could not be civilly liable under § 2339A, but plaintiffs to whom Fa-
cebook owes a duty of care could file traditional tort lawsuits under appli-
cable theories of vicarious liability—but for the shield of § 230 of the 
CDA.143 
B. Section 230: The Internet’s Liability Riot Shield 
As terrorist activity online has grown and gained mainstream notoriety, 
a streak of plaintiffs have attempted to hold the social media platforms who 
host terrorist content civilly liable for providing material support under 
                                                                                                                           
K8GM-7Q6T (archiving the video)] (calling for sympathizers to join in the armed occupation of 
the wildlife refuge before it began); Bundy Ranch, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/bundy
ranch/videos/938588846217924 [https://perma.cc/PEL3-VT6F (archiving the Facebook page), 
https://perma.cc/S3HY-5M42 (archiving the video)] [hereinafter Occupation Video] (publicizing 
the commencement of the occupation); see also Criminal Complaint, United States v. Bundy et al., 
No. 3:16-cr-00051 (D.Or. Apr. 11, 2016) (detailing both the videos posted on Bundy’s website 
“Citizens for Constitutional Freedom News Conference” as well as Bundy’s extensive social me-
dia presence, both prior to and during the occupation). 
 140 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; see id. § 930(c) (prohibiting the killing of a person during an armed 
attack on a federal facility); id. § 1361 (prohibiting injuring or depredating federal government prop-
erty). Both § 930(c) and § 1361 are enumerated in § 2339A. Id. § 2339A. One of the militants, Rob-
ert LaVoy Finicum, was killed in a shootout with the FBI during the fourth week of occupation. Pete 
Williams et al., Oregon Occupation Leaders Arrested, One Dead in Shooting, NBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 
2016, 8:48 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/oregon-occupation-leader-ammon-
bundy-arrested-law-enforcement-sources-n504911 [https://perma.cc/M828-A7Y6]. The felony 
murder rule could impart liability on Finicum’s co-conspirators, who were attempting to escape 
the police. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (imputing culpability for any killing that occurs during the 
commission of a dangerous felony to anyone guilty of the felony, even when the felon is not the 
killer). 
 141 See 18 U.S.C. § 930(c) (prohibiting the killing of a person during an armed attack on a 
federal facility); id. § 1361 (prohibiting injuring or depredating federal government property); 
supra note 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 142 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Boim, 549 F.3d at 693–94 (holding a third party liable for provid-
ing material support for providing funds to a terrorist group, even though he did not know those 
funds would be used to support terrorism); supra note 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 143 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) 
(2012). 
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§ 2339A and § 2339B.144 Because civil remedy only exists for international 
terrorism, only victims of international terrorism have attempted suit under 
these statutes, and all have failed.145 
The most prominent of attempts to undermine § 230 is Fields v. Twit-
ter, Inc., wherein the family members of two government contractors shot 
and killed in Jordan by an ISIS gunman brought suit against Twitter for al-
lowing ISIS to make use of its services.146 The case was dismissed twice, 
with the court finding each claim barred by the CDA.147 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that in allowing ISIS to sign up for accounts, Twitter had provided 
material support to a DFTO in violation of § 2339B.148 Anticipating the 
CDA challenge, the plaintiffs argued that while the CDA prevents civil 
plaintiffs from holding an edge provider liable for engaging in “publishing 
activities,” a publishing activity requires making content-based editorial 
decisions, and Twitter’s decision to provide accounts to ISIS was content 
neutral, and thus not a “publishing activity” as defined and protected by the 
CDA.149 The court was not convinced, holding that any decision to provide 
or refuse an account to a user based on affiliation with ISIS is a content-
based decision qualifying as a publishing activity.150 As a result, Twitter 
could not be held liable for providing accounts to members of ISIS.151 The 
Fields court was strict in its application of the CDA, writing that any plead-
ing that mentions Twitter’s decision to exclude something from its platform 
is inherently an attempt to treat Twitter as a publisher because it describes 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1154–55; Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 877; Cohen, 
252 F. Supp. 3d at 146; see also infra notes 146–196 and accompanying text (discussing several of 
these recent cases). 
 145 Goldman, Seventh Lawsuit, supra note 92; see infra notes 146–196 and accompanying text 
(explaining the respective courts’ rationales for dismissing the suits). 
 146 Fields II, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1117; Fields v. Twitter, Inc. (Fields I), 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 
966 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Plaintiffs specifically alleged that ISIS uses Twitter as a recruiting, fund-
raising, and communications platform, and had recruited over 30,000 members through Twitter 
within one year. Fields I, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 967–68. 
 147 Fields II, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1119; Fields I, 200 F. Supp. at 966. 
 148 Fields II, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. 
 149 Id. at 1122. More specifically, plaintiffs argued that their complaint was content-neutral, 
because ISIS’s actual activities on the platform were irrelevant—the simple act of furnishing ac-
counts to ISIS members was itself a provision of material support to a DFTO. Id. Twitter coun-
tered, and the court agreed, that both the first and second complaints relied on descriptions of 
ISIS-related content. Id. The court further held that, even had the complaint been content-neutral, 
the decision to furnish an account is functionally no different than the essential editorial decision 
of a publisher to print or not print content, and the complaint was therefore still dependent on 
Twitter’s conduct as a publisher. Id. at 1124–25. 
 150 Id. at 1124–25. The plaintiffs’ claims also failed because they did not sufficiently allege 
proximate cause, a requirement for civil suits. Id. at 1126–27. The court held that ISIS’s use of 
Twitter as an organization could not plausibly be considered a proximate cause of the shooting, 
because the gunman was not himself a Twitter user. Id. 
 151 Id. at 1124–25. 
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the content Twitter chooses to host.152 Decisions over what content to host 
are content-based publication decisions, and Twitter’s provision of accounts 
to its users was in fact a decision over what content it hosts.153 The suit was 
therefore barred by the CDA.154 
Fields is one of many lawsuits that have failed for the same reason.155 
A litany of dismissals has permeated district courts in recent years, with all 
failing to allege liability without treating the edge provider as a publisher.156 
Some suits have attempted to challenge the statute itself: in Gonzalez v. 
Google, Inc., in addition to claiming that Google’s hosting of content was 
not a publishing activity, the plaintiff also unsuccessfully alleged that when 
Congress passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”) 
in 2016, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to create civil liability, it effectively 
repealed § 230.157 Once again, the court was unconvinced, holding that 
§ 230 was always intended to limit civil liability and, absent express lan-
guage, should not be interpreted otherwise.158 Every adjudicated suit that 
has attempted this argument has failed.159 
The most recent (and unsuccessful) innovation in legal theories at-
tempting to sidestep the CDA began after the 2016 Pulse nightclub shoot-
ing.160 In 2016, an ISIS-affiliated gunman opened fire on an Orlando gay 
nightclub, Pulse, killing forty-nine and wounding fifty-eight.161 When fami-
lies of shooting victims brought suit against Twitter, Facebook, and Google, 
they anticipated the CDA bar and claimed to have founded their theory of 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 1125. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the 
issue, instead focusing on the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately allege proximate cause. See Fields 
III, 881 F.3d 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 155 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim as barred by the 
CDA); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 159–60 (dismissing both plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the 
CDA). 
 156 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim as barred by 
the CDA); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 159–60 (dismissing both plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the 
CDA). Notably, several of these suits were filed by the same group: 1-800-LAW-FIRM. Anti-
Terrorism, Terror Victims v. Social Media Giants, 1-800-LAW-FIRM, https://www.1800lawfirm.
com/practice-areas/anti-terrorism [https://perma.cc/TS8X-3XRJ]. 
 157 Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1159; see Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. 
No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016); 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 158 Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1159–60. 
 159 Goldman, Seventh Lawsuit, supra note 92; see, e.g., Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 889; Co-
hen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 159–60. 
 160 See Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-14406, 2017 WL 4224194 at *3. (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 31, 2017). 
 161 Lizette Alvarez & Richard Pérez Peña, Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 
Dead, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-nightclub-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/MSX3-ECD2]. 
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liability not on providing accounts, but on shared advertising agreements.162 
The plaintiffs of Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., first argued that Twitter, Facebook, 
and Google’s “provision of the infrastructure” of their platforms was mate-
rial support because it allowed ISIS to flourish online.163 To circumvent the 
CDA, however, the plaintiffs grounded their argument in targeted advertis-
ing agreements.164 Social media sites engineer algorithms to target adver-
tisements to specific demographics of consumers, including ideological 
demographics, and site personnel must manually approve any advertiser 
requesting use of some of those algorithms.165 Plaintiffs argued that because 
Twitter, Facebook, and Google exercise control over advertising, when they 
combined ISIS postings with their own advertisements, the result was a cre-
ation of content.166 In creating content, plaintiffs argued, these edge provid-
ers were not computer services, but rather content providers, and therefore 
not entitled to immunity under the CDA.167 Like Fields, Crosby was ulti-
mately dismissed for lack of proximate causation between ISIS’s Twitter 
accounts and the shooter himself.168 The second question of whether § 230 
applies when combining advertisements with posts remains unresolved.169 
Despite the seeming invulnerability § 230 provides to edge providers, 
§ 230 is in danger.170 In Gonzalez, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that 
Congress’ passage of JASTA implicitly repealed § 230.171 The court’s disa-
                                                                                                                           
 162 See First Amended Complaint, Crosby, 2017 WL 4224194, at *3. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See id.; Alex Andrada-Walz, What Can and Can’t You Do with Political Advertising on 
Facebook?, SPATIALLY (Feb. 26, 2018) http://www.spatially.com/blog/political-advertising-on-
facebook [https://perma.cc/FR5B-4F7F] (explaining that Facebook’s text analysis of its users 
separates them into distinct political affiliation groups, and political advertisers may target these 
groups once they provide documentation to Facebook staff verifying identity and location); Face-
book Advertising Targeting, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting 
[https://perma.cc/RTT9-QD5X?type=image] (enabling advertisers to target algorithmically select-
ed groups of users). 
 166 First Amended Complaint, supra note 162, at *3. 
 167 Id. When an edge provider creates content, they are an “information content provider” for 
CDA purposes, and the CDA does not exempt content providers from liability. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c). 
 168 Fields, 881 F.3d at 749–50; Crosby, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 570. 
 169 Crosby, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 570. The presiding judge declined to address the CDA because 
without adequately pleaded causation, the plaintiffs had not stated any claim for which a court 
could grant relief. Id. 
 170 See Eric Goldman, Senate’s “Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017”—and Section 
230’s Imminent Evisceration, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 31, 2017), https://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2017/07/senates-stop-enabling-sex-traffickers-act-of-2017-and-section-230s-
imminent-evisceration.htm [https://perma.cc/6SKQ-EDFT]; infra notes 171–196 and accompany-
ing text. 
 171 Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1159. See generally Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act (JASTA), Pub. L. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016). JASTA was enacted to “hold foreign spon-
sors of terrorism that target the United States accountable in Federal courts” by eliminating im-
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greement was founded in JASTA’s irrelevance to the CDA; JASTA does not 
reference the CDA or computer service providers, nor did Congress make 
such reference during the bill’s passage.172 The CDA remains intact so long 
as direct congressional action does not erode it—which it might.173 
On April 11, 2018, President Donald Trump signed the Allow States 
and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”) into 
law.174 FOSTA expressly amends § 230 to revoke liability protection for any 
Internet service or edge provider in cases involving sex trafficking by force 
or child sex trafficking.175 Sponsored by Rep. Ann Wagner (R-MO) and 
drafted in response to Backpage.com’s facilitation of sex trafficking, the 
law first finds that § 230 was “never intended to provide legal protection to 
websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts 
with sex trafficking victims.”176 Next, it broadly amends § 230 to permit 
civil suit against an Internet computer service that violates specific federal 
child sex trafficking laws, federal laws which prohibit sex trafficking by 
force, or equivalent state laws.177 18 U.S.C. § 1595 allows the victim of a 
sex trafficking crime to bring suit against both the perpetrator and anyone 
who benefits from the sex trafficking, and FOSTA also amends § 230 to 
expressly allow suits brought under § 1595.178 Section 1595 is the sex traf-
ficking equivalent of § 2333, and it functions similarly in that it creates civil 
liability not only for perpetrators, but also for anyone who knowingly bene-
fits from participating in anything they knew (or should have known) vio-
lated sex trafficking law.179 Finally, the law expressly states that should an 
edge provider recklessly disregard that their platform has been used to pro-
                                                                                                                           
munity for foreign states who either directly or by omission sponsor terrorism in the United States. 
Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. The Senators sponsoring JASTA stated they intended the law 
to “close a loophole” that prevented families of 9/11 first responders from “pursu[ing] their claims 
for justice against those who sponsored those acts of terrorism on U.S. homeland.” Id. 
 172 Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1159–60. 
 173 See, e.g., Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) of 2017, 
Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (creating an exception in the CDA permitting suit 
against edge providers in sex trafficking cases); see also infra notes 174–196 and accompanying 
text. 
 174 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 § 2. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. Backpage.com was an online classified advertising website, similar to Craigslist. Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Leads Effort to Seize Backpage.Com, the Internet’s 
Leading Forum for Prostitution Ads, and Obtains 93-Count Federal Indictment (Apr. 9, 2018). 
Adult sex workers used its “adult services” sections to advertise their services, but the site also 
included advertisements for child prostitution. Id. In 2018, the Department of Justice seized Back-
page.com and charged its founders with 93 counts relating to a conspiracy to facilitate prostitution. 
Id. 
 177 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act § 4. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (creating liability for violations of § 2339A and § 2339B, which 
prohibit providing material support in violation of terrorism law). 
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mote or facilitate sex trafficking, civil litigants may file suit against them.180 
In passing FOSTA, Congress declined to adopt the Senate version of the 
bill, introduced by Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) as the Stop Enabling Sex 
Traffickers Act of 2017 (“SESTA”).181 SESTA did not include the “reckless 
disregard” language, and critics of both SESTA and FOSTA regarded SES-
TA as considerably less corrosive to the CDA.182 
Sex trafficking is not the only proposed exception to the CDA: in 
2014, Representative Jackie Speier (D-CA) worked to draft legislation that 
would criminalize “revenge porn”—non-consensual distribution of intimate 
content—which she claimed would strip edge providers of the ability to 
raise § 230 immunity.183 She subsequently introduced the Intimate Privacy 
Protection Act (“IPPA”) in 2016, but the bill was amended to specifically 
exempt interactive computer service providers, including ISPs and edge 
providers, likely at the behest of Google.184 Similar to FOSTA, IPPA would 
prohibit an edge provider from recklessly disregarding whether the sexually 
explicit content being distributed on its platform is nonconsensual.185 
Both FOSTA and IPPA represent attempts to curtail the CDA, and both 
prohibit reckless disregard for support of sex traffickers or revenge porn.186 
Consequently, both permit convicting edge providers of recklessly provid-
ing support for each respective crime.187 As commenters have already 
pointed out, a determined Congress, using the public safety justification at 
the hearts of these bills, could easily transpose the frameworks of FOSTA or 
                                                                                                                           
 180 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act § 3; 18 U.S.C. § 2421A. 
 181 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act § 3; Stop Enabling Sex 
Traffickers Act of 2017, S.1693, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 182 Id.; see Goldman, supra note 170 (highlighting that, unlike FOSTA, SESTA would not 
have opened up CDA exceptions to include state claims). 
 183 Steven Nelson, Federal ‘Revenge Porn’ Bill Will Seek to Shrivel Booming Internet Fad, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:01 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2014/03/26/federal-revenge-porn-bill-will-seek-to-shrivel-booming-internet-fad [https://perma.cc/
5GSP-MU8H]. 
 184 Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016); see Sarah Jeong, 
New Revenge Porn Bill Shows Silicon Valley’s Influence in Politics, MOTHERBOARD (July 15, 2016, 
4:28 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/53d59z/new-revenge-porn-bill-shows-silicon-
valleys-influence-in-politics [https://perma.cc/RU8Y-3BNJ]. Google opposed the initial draft of 
the bill but does not oppose the current version. See Jeong, supra. 
 185 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, H.R. 1865, 
115th Cong. (2017) (“[W]hoever . . . owns, manages, or operates . . . an interactive computer ser-
vices and . . . acts in reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex trafficking 
. . . .”); Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 186 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act § 3; Intimate Privacy 
Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 187 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act § 3 (applying liability to 
intermediaries who facilitate sex trafficking); Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 
114th Cong. (2016) (applying liability to intermediaries who host “revenge porn”). 
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IPPA onto terrorism material support law.188 IPPA, FOSTA, and § 2339A 
share similar skeletons, in that they all prohibit a party from recklessly dis-
regarding whether their support benefits a crime.189 
While § 2333 suits against edge providers may fall to the CDA, else-
where, the CDA is being weakened in court.190 In 2016, the Ninth Circuit 
held in Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc. that when the plaintiff attempted 
to hold an edge provider liable for the actions of its users, she was not 
barred by the CDA.191 The plaintiff alleged that Internet Brands was aware 
that two of its male users were using the platform to organize attacks on 
female users.192 The court held that the plaintiff was not attempting to hold 
Internet Brands liable as the publisher of the men’s speech, but rather that 
Internet Brands had negligently failed to warn her of the danger.193 The fail-
ure to warn was not a publishing decision, as she was not asking Internet 
Brands to add or remove content, and therefore the suit was not barred by 
the CDA because an edge provider’s duty to warn did not implicate its abil-
ity to publish content, and the suit was therefore not barred by the CDA.194 
Another dent in the shield appeared in Huon v. Denton, where in 2016 the 
Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not permit CDA im-
munity for the website Gawker in a defamation suit because Gawker was a 
content provider.195 Gawker had assisted in developing the defamatory 
speech by inviting users to post inflammatory and often defamatory com-
ments, some of them authored by anonymous Gawker employees.196 
                                                                                                                           
 188 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; see, e.g., Goldman, supra note 170 (pointing out direct parallels be-
tween challenges to § 230 stemming from terrorism and sex trafficking). 
 189 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act § 3; 
Intimate Privacy Protection Act. 
 190 See, e.g., Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016); see also 
infra notes 194–196 and accompanying text. 
 191 Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851. 
 192 Id. Internet Brands provided a service wherein aspiring models could post information for 
professional networking purposes. Id. at 848. Jane Doe alleged that two individuals used the web-
site to fraudulently pose as talent agents and lure victims to a fake audition, where they were then 
drugged, raped, and recorded for digital distribution. Id. Doe alleged that she was a victim of this 
scheme in 2011, and that Internet Brands had been aware of the perpetrators’ activities as early as 
2010. Id. at 848–49. 
 193 Id. at 850–51. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff in Huon sued now-
defunct news entertainment company Gawker and its founder, Nick Denton, for defamation after 
its employees curated user comments and posted their own anonymous comments to an allegedly 
defamatory news article, for the purposes of generating traffic. Id. 
 196 Id. 
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III. IF THE LAW SHOULD CHANGE, HOW?: PROPOSING MODEST 
AMENDMENTS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM LAW 
“Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools.”197 
Buzzfeed reporters uncovered these words in an internal memo penned in 
2016 by Facebook Vice President Andrew Bosworth.198 In the memo, Bos-
worth justifies the risks of collateral damage that Facebook poses as an ac-
ceptable cost of Facebook’s mission of connecting people across the 
world.199 Current law seems to agree—but should it?200 
Liability, or at least vulnerability to suit, is already not as far-fetched as 
edge providers would like.201 It is not impossible to prosecute an edge pro-
vider for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, should the government be so in-
clined.202 Section 2339A may not permit civil suit, but victims of domestic 
terrorism can still pursue justice through traditional tort remedies.203 The 
only true legal barrier for plaintiffs looking to hold a tech company liable 
for providing domestic terrorists with a platform is § 230 of the CDA, and it 
is in danger.204 With escalating domestic terrorism and consequent pressure 
on tech companies to responsibly monitor their platforms, it is worth con-
templating if and how the framework for material support liability in do-
                                                                                                                           
 197 Ryan Mac et al., Growth at Any Cost: Top Facebook Executive Defended Data Collection in 
2016 Memo—And Warned That Facebook Could Get People Killed, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar 29, 
2018) https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/growth-at-any-cost-top-facebook-executive-
defended-data [https://perma.cc/L5RH-457E]. 
 198 Id. Bosworth wrote the memo one day after a deadly Chicago shooting was recorded and 
streamed on Facebook Live, the company’s video streaming service. Id. A Facebook employee, 
disgruntled with the lack of response from either Mark Zuckerberg or the company, produced the 
memo to journalists at Buzzfeed after Bosworth was tapped for a promotion. Id. Zuckerberg and 
Bosworth have both since denounced the views expressed in the memo, which is known internally 
as “The Ugly” and is still available for Facebook employees to view. Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See id.; Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that 
Congress’s intent in passing the § 230 was to eliminate the “specter of tort liability”); infra notes 
202–251 and accompanying text (weighing the speech and economic interests of maintaining the 
§ 230 against the threat of rapid online radicalization). 
 201 See Goldman, supra note 170 (arguing that FOSTA’s passage could be the first of many 
new exceptions to the CDA); infra notes 202–204 and accompanying text. 
 202 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (criminalizing providing material support for an act of 
terrorism, not excluding domestic terrorism). By damaging a federal facility and participating in a 
shootout that resulted in the death of a person, the Bundy occupation ostensibly violated federal 
terrorism law. See id. § 1361 (prohibiting injuring or depredating federal government property); 
id. § 930(c) (prohibiting the killing of a person during an armed attack on a federal facility); Crim-
inal Complaint, USA v. Bundy et al, 3:16-cr-00051 (D.Or. 2016) (detailing extensive social media 
presence of Bundy both prior to and during the occupation); Occupation Video, supra note 139. 
 203 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
 204 See e.g., Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, H.R. 
1865, 115th Cong. (2017); 18 U.S.C. § 2421A (2018) (substantially amending § 230 to exclude 
sex trafficking crimes and civil actions from its protections, including when an Internet computer 
service recklessly disregards whether its users engage in sex trafficking); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
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mestic terrorism law should be revised.205 This Part posits a few possibili-
ties for the future of domestic terror law and analyzes potential outcomes, 
should those possibilities come to pass.206 Section A discusses the infeasi-
bility and inadvisability of repealing § 230.207 Section B suggests providing 
a civil remedy for domestic terror victims via § 2339A and outlines how 
such a remedy’s benefits would outweigh any consequences.208 
A. If It Ain’t Broke: The Inadvisability of Repealing or  
Further Altering 18 U.S.C. § 230(c) 
The United States is no stranger to curtailing individual civil liberties 
in the interest of more effectively fighting foreign terror threats.209 The 
CDA is already facing imminent erosion on other fronts, suggesting that 
further congressional action against § 230 in the terror sphere is possible.210 
A full repeal of § 230 would, of course, be catastrophic to the Internet.211 
While the free speech implications of holding massive platforms liable for 
their userbases are debatable, the logistical implications are not.212 
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 206 See infra notes 209–251 and accompanying text. 
 207 See infra notes 209–222 and accompanying text. 
 208 See infra notes 223–251 and accompanying text. 
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congress-is-about-to-ruin-its-online-free-speech-masterpiece-cross-post.htm [https://perma.cc/
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The CDA has provided protection for Internet edge providers since the 
early days of the Internet, well before the modern social media ecosystem 
was established.213 This protection has enabled technologies and tech em-
pires to develop unfettered by any need to incorporate monitoring systems 
to ameliorate their own liability.214 To create liability now would also create 
a logistical nightmare for edge providers as large as Facebook or Twitter.215 
It is unreasonable to expect edge providers, particularly tech social media 
giants with incomprehensibly large userbases, to actively monitor massive 
quantities of data simply to protect themselves from suit.216 Even if liability 
were limited to edge providers who had actual—not just constructive—
notice of unlawful behavior within their control to suspend, yet chose not to 
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Has More Promising Approach to Regulating Online Sex Trafficking, TECHN. & MARKETING L. 
BLOG (Dec. 11, 2017) https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/12/new-house-bill-substitute-
fosta-has-more-promising-approach-to-regulating-online-sex-trafficking.htm [https://perma.cc/
MN7Y-5G7U]. 
1764 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1731 
curtail it, the sheer breadth of potential causes of action against a publisher 
of content would require extraordinary investment in both algorithmic mon-
itoring systems and monitoring staff.217 Many large tech companies are al-
ready unprofitable, and requiring an investment of this magnitude could 
strain their capital to a breaking point.218 Moreover, imposing an actual 
knowledge requirement may incentivize tech companies to actively avoid 
gaining any dangerous knowledge by abandoning content moderation alto-
gether.219 
One alternative to full repeal is a narrow exclusion for suits pursued 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, much like the exclusion in FOSTA, but while this 
solution is less inherently unfair than a full repeal, not only would it cause 
the same logistical problems for edge providers, it would also provide no 
remedy for victims of domestic terror.220 With a full repeal, victims of do-
mestic terror could at least file traditional tort suits, but a narrow § 2333 
exception would preclude even that.221 Without addressing remedies for 
domestic terror victims, any repeal or narrowing of the CDA creates far 
more problems than it solves.222 
B. A Good Compromise Leaves Both Sides Equally Dissatisfied 
To properly balance the interests of tech companies and victims of 
domestic terrorism, Congress should amend § 2333 to expand § 2339A civil 
causes of action to include providing material support to domestic terrorist 
acts.223 Such an amendment would be narrow enough in its applicability to 
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avoid ravaging the modern Internet landscape while addressing an enforce-
ment gap and encouraging better practices by edge providers.224 
Any discussion of holding edge providers liable for the speech of their 
users inevitably invites debate over whether such a policy implicates free 
speech concerns.225 An argument against stronger domestic terrorism law in 
general is that a framework in parity with foreign terror law could easily 
result in classifying political activists as terrorists, thereby chilling 
speech.226 While this more generalized concern should not be downplayed, 
domestic terror is prosecuted based on defendants’ actions, not their affilia-
tion, and the limited toolset in § 2339A itself means that the reach of any 
chilling effect is just as limited.227 Section 2339A criminalizes knowingly 
providing material support for domestic terror attacks, but the scope of what 
constitutes a domestic terror attack is narrow.228 Any attack at issue must 
fall within several enumerated offenses and must fit the definition of do-
mestic terrorism as provided by § 2331(5).229 To be guilty, a third party 
must then provide material resources or support while knowing that it will 
be used in preparation for an attack.230 Moreover, for liability to apply to a 
third party, those attacks must fall under one of few enumerated, specific 
offenses; simple harm to human life will not do.231 The recent spate of law-
suits against Twitter, YouTube, and Google, while arguably frivolous given 
the strength of the CDA were still only possible because the perpetrators of 
the attacks were associated with DFTOs and thus fell within the far broader 
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reach of § 2339B.232 By limiting a civil cause of action for material support 
of domestic terrorism only to terrorism covered by § 2339A, lawsuits would 
necessarily require a causal nexus between the edge provider’s support and 
the specific attack.233 
Additionally, with § 230 fully intact, successful lawsuits would require 
the publishing edge provider to actually be complicit in hosting terrorist 
content.234 Section 230 may prohibit holding edge providers vicariously 
liable for the content they host by prohibiting treating them as its publisher, 
but the statute does not apply to edge providers who are complicit in devel-
oping the content of the speech.235 When an edge provider develops speech, 
they are not a computer service, they are a content provider, and thus they 
are directly liable for the speech itself.236 Presently there is an enforcement 
gap in terrorism law: victims of international terror may seek redress 
against an edge provider that is actually complicit in perpetrating terrorism, 
but a domestic terror victim cannot.237 Therefore, websites like Iron-
March.org, where the owner actively cultivated an extremist userbase in-
cluding members of Atomwaffen, cannot be pursued under current federal 
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law.238 Amending § 2333 would bridge this gap without circumventing the 
core of the CDA.239 Under such an amendment, websites like Iron-
March.org, where the owner was complicit in hosting violent content in-
cluding preparation for terror attacks, would be vulnerable to civil suit.240 
Facebook, however, would not be liable for hosting Ammon Bundy’s multi-
ple calls to arms and preparatory videos.241 Though Bundy’s underlying 
felonies fall under § 2339A, Facebook was not complicit in generating con-
tent with Bundy.242 Facebook is therefore not a content provider, and claims 
against them for contributing to Bundy’s terrorist actions would be barred 
by the CDA.243 
Finally, amending § 2333 would encourage better practices by edge 
providers who do not actively participate in fostering or hosting domestic 
terrorism.244 Litigation against edge providers for hosting foreign terrorist 
organizations, while unsuccessful, has brought political pressure to bear and 
has ultimately resulted in social media companies undertaking anti-
terrorism measures on their platforms.245 At present, most of these measures 
are centered around foreign extremism.246 Should edge providers become 
potentially liable for providing material support to discrete domestic terror 
attacks, these beneficial anti-terror efforts might be applied in the domestic 
sphere as well.247 Even public, nongovernmental pressure to crack down on 
white supremacy has yielded positive results: Twitter recently banned many 
accounts associated with white supremacy, and YouTube has demonetized 
or suspended several extremist accounts.248 Although some commenters 
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argue these actions alone are evidence of chilled speech, edge providers are 
free to respond to free market pressure as they deem necessary.249 Ultimate-
ly, amending § 2333 to permit a very narrow subset of cases, to be pursued 
only when the edge provider actually develops speech, will disincentivize 
complicity in domestic terrorism while leaving the CDA itself intact.250 A 
very narrow path to justice for victims of domestic terrorism will not dra-
matically alter a tech company’s cost-benefit calculations, but sealing this 
open box of bad intent, bad players, and bad technology may, in the end, 
save lives.251 
CONCLUSION 
White nationalist and neo-Nazi violence has accounted for dozens of 
deaths in recent years, impacting not only the lives of those directly affected, 
but also the public and political discourse about terrorism and extremism. The 
Internet’s concurrent expansion into Americans’ lives to the point of near-
total ubiquity plays a critical role in this discussion, as social media allows for 
people with fringe viewpoints to connect, converse, and ultimately radicalize. 
That radicalization can and often does result in violence, and that violence 
often takes the form of domestic terrorism. 
The federal framework for prosecuting domestic terrorism is shaky at 
best, and the added shield of § 230 of the CDA seemingly eliminates any pos-
sibility of prosecuting or holding tech companies liable for the content their 
platforms host, even when that content is directly tied to domestic terrorism. 
This is not necessarily a bad thing, as the Internet ecosystem has flourished 
under minimal regulation, and creating liability for hosting content would 
stymie, if not outright extinguish, that growth. But growth uninhibited by 
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consideration for human cost is not morally or politically sustainable, and 
lawmakers face an impending balancing act between disregarding safety or 
cutting the Internet off at its knees. Thus far, they are leaning towards the lat-
ter. 
Rather than passively allowing terrorism to fester on websites that court 
extremist content, or worse, taking drastic steps such as gutting the CDA, 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to permit victims of domestic ter-
rorism to file civil suits against edge providers who are complicit in providing 
material support to acts of terror. Such a moderate solution would create only 
minor waves, forcing liability onto edge providers whose actions proximately 
cause harm, but without the collateral damage to tech companies who do not. 
Liability can be an effective deterrent, and when the grounds for suit are suf-
ficiently narrow, the risk of tech companies overcorrecting is just as slim. 
EMILY B. TATE 
  
 
